

Winning the improbable

Birthday Paradox

$$P(\text{Two out of 23 men have birthday on the same date}) = 1 - \frac{365 \times 364 \times \dots \times 343}{365^{23}} = 1 - 0.4927... > 0.5$$

Two Envelopes

Game: 2 envelopes X, Y with \$x and \$y=2x

Player: chose one (A), decides: switch/ keep

Naive switching argument:

$$b = 2a \Leftrightarrow P(a \text{ smaller}) = P(a = x) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$b = \frac{1}{2} a \Leftrightarrow P(a \text{ greater}) = P(a = y) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$E(B|A=a) = P(a=y) * \frac{1}{2} a + P(a=x) * 2a = \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{2} a + \frac{1}{2} * 2a = \frac{5}{4} a > a \quad \forall a \Rightarrow \text{switch in every case}$$

Problem now: $P(A|B) = \frac{5}{4} b > b \Rightarrow \text{switch again ...}$

Calculation based on fixed x instead of variable a

$$P(x=a) = P(x=a/2) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$E(B|X=x) = P(x=a) * 2x + P(x=a/2) * x = \frac{3}{2} x$$

$$E(A|X=x) = (x+y) - E(B|X=x) = 3x - \frac{3}{2} x = \frac{3}{2} x$$

With prior density:

Probability distributions for every possible value

Possible: $E(B|A=a) > a \quad \forall a$

Probability distribution for X: fixed

\Rightarrow for A, B fixed (since $P[(A,B)=(X,Y)] = P[(A,B)=(Y,X)] = \frac{1}{2}$)

[Example in the appendix]

Infinite Game: $E(B|A=a) > a \quad \forall a \Rightarrow E(B) > E(A)$ or $E(B) = E(A) = \infty$

Same prior distribution for A and B \Rightarrow same expected value $\Rightarrow E(B) = E(A) = \infty$

Mathematical guarantee for better chances after switching only: $E(A), E(B)$ finite

Reality: limited amount of money in the world

Bayes (Thomas Bayes) - Degree of belief

Bayesian Theorem

$$P(H_n|E) * P(E) = P(H_n \cap E) = P(E|H_n) * P(H_n)$$

H_1, \dots, H_k : Hypothesis beneath one is true

$$\Leftrightarrow P(H_n|E) = \frac{P(E|H_n) * P(H_n)}{P(E)}$$

Bayesian statistics

Application of the theorem in a wider interpretation of degree of belief

Criticized (inexact results, too many conclusions out of observations, often failure)

Newcomb

Realist:

Choice after prediction, free will \Rightarrow take AB

Dominance principle: taking AB is always better than only B \Rightarrow use this strategy

Box A \$ 1,000

Box B \$ 1,000,000 or \$ 0 after prediction algorithm
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Fearful:

Expected-utility principle: Prediction algorithm always right: $P(\text{predict B, take AB}) = P(\text{predict AB, take B}) = 0$
 \Rightarrow only possibilities: \$ 1,000 and \$ 1,000,000 \Rightarrow take B

Appendix

Example prior density

$$p(n) := P(x=\$2^n) = \frac{2^n}{3^{n+1}} \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{N}_0 \quad : \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} p(n) = 1$$

Case 1: $a = 1 = 2^0 \Rightarrow b = 2a = 2 \Rightarrow E(B|a=1) > a$

Case 2: $a > 1, a = 2^m (m \in \mathbb{N})$

$\Rightarrow (X, Y) = (2^m, 2^{m+1})$ or $(X, Y) = (2^{m-1}, 2^m)$

$P((X, Y) = (2^{m-1}, 2^m) | a = 2^m) =$

$$\frac{\frac{P((2^{m-1}, 2^m))}{2}}{\frac{P((2^{m-1}, 2^m))}{2} + \frac{P((2^m, 2^{m+1}))}{2}} = \frac{P((2^{m-1}, 2^m))}{P((2^{m-1}, 2^m)) + P((2^m, 2^{m+1}))} = \frac{p(m-1)}{p(m-1) + p(m)}$$

$$\frac{\frac{2^{m-1}}{3^m}}{\frac{2^{m-1}}{3^m} + \frac{2^m}{3^{m+1}}} = \frac{2^{m-1} \cdot 3}{2^{m-1} \cdot 3 + 2^m} = \frac{3}{2 + 3} = 3/5$$

$P((X, Y) = (2^m, 2^{m+1}) | a = 2^m) = 1 - 3/5 = 2/5$

$E(B|A=2^m) = 3/5 \cdot 2^{m-1} + 2/5 \cdot 2^{m+1} = 11/10 \cdot 2^m > 2^m = a$

$\Rightarrow E(B|A=a) > a \quad \forall a \Rightarrow$ always switch

Sources

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_envelopes_problem